


A Room of One's Own is all you can afford: Why young women move to the far right

Javier Carbonell



Credit: Heirs of Josephine Hopper / Licensed by Artists Rights Society (ARS), VEGAP, Madrid. All rights reserved. Courtesy of the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum, Madrid

Table of contents

Executive summary	2
Young women moving to the right	4
Why the shift?	6
Recommendations	11
Conclusion	13
Endnotes	14

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Javier Carbonell is a Policy Analyst in the European Politics and Institutions programme at the European Policy Centre.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / DISCLAIMER

The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the author only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

Executive summary

It has become common to argue that young men in Western countries are moving steadily to the right, while young women are shifting leftwards, widening the gender divide within Generation Z.¹ Even where this pattern holds, it obscures a more complex reality: that young women are also voting for far-right parties in growing numbers and actively participating in the broader rightward and anti-feminist shift seen in many European countries.²

This paper argues that while young men exhibit a relatively uniform turn to the right, young women are increasingly polarised. Most are moving further left,³ but a significant minority are also drifting toward hard-right alternatives, rejecting feminism and embracing traditional gender norms. It is not that young women are moving away from far-right parties, but simply that they are moving towards them at a slower pace. In this sense, young women's political trajectories are no less concerning for the future of liberal democracy than those of young men.

This development is hardly surprising. Over the last years, far-right vote share has increased across all demographic groups⁴ amid a broad social-conservative turn. However, gender-specific drivers are also at play, with housing insecurity and labour-market discontent topping the list for young women. In many Western European countries, young women now outperform young men in higher education graduation rates and even in earnings.⁵ Yet they enter the labour market at a time when young people have lower wealth, incomes and purchasing power than previous generations.⁶ The precarious labour market, increasing cost of childrearing and housing crisis make traditional female roles outside the labour market appear less risky and more appealing. The far right has mobilised this frustration, romanticising a fictitious, idealised past that operates as a sharp critique of an unaffordable present.

Addressing the rightward shift among young people requires looking beyond young men alone and taking seriously the political radicalisation occurring among young women.⁷ More broadly, it demands tackling the structural drivers of this trend, rooted in Europe's housing, labour-market and family crises. A robust economic agenda must centre on affordability, wealth redistribution and youth housing access. Because many far-right political and cultural narratives are amplified on digital platforms, stronger enforcement of existing EU legislation in the online sphere is essential.

Gender-equality movements must adopt a more anti-establishment stance that treats the far right as the new status quo, exposing its limits and offering credible alternatives.

Far-right and anti-feminist narratives are no longer fringe; they have become mainstream, especially among younger generations. Gender-equality movements must adopt a more counter-hegemonic, anti-establishment stance that treats the far right not as a political outsider, but as the the new status quo, exposing its limits and offering credible alternatives. Only by confronting the gender backlash head-on – alongside the green, migration and democratic backlashes – can a genuinely pro-democracy mobilisation of Europe's youth emerge.⁸

Young women moving to the right

The 2025 German elections are often taken as an example of the gender division among Gen Z, with 26% of men under 25 voting for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and 35% of young women voting for the left-wing.⁹ However, if look at voting across time a different picture appears. While in 2021 only 5% of young women voted for the AfD, that number tripled by 2025, with 14% of young women opting for the far-right party.¹⁰ Thus, support for the AfD increased among both young men and young women.

This is not just a German story, but a trend seen across all of Europe. As Figure 1 shows, both young men and young women have increased their far-right vote in national elections in the last decade. While young men are obviously much more supportive of the far-right than other demographic group, the trend is similar in all of them. This means that an increasing number of young women are also voting for far-right parties. The growing far-right gender divide is not caused because young women are moving away from far-right parties, but simply because they are moving towards them at a slower pace.

The growing far-right gender divide is not because young women are moving away from far-right parties, but simply because they are moving towards them at a slower pace.

Moreover, the far-right gender voting gap narrows with age. While in some countries this is because older men vote less for the far right than younger men, in most cases, it is because older women vote more for the far right than younger women.¹¹ As Figure 2 demonstrates, in the last European Parliament elections, while younger and older men voted the same for the far right, older women voted four percentage points more for the far-right than younger women.


This phenomenon is likely the result of older women's greater concern for security and immigration.¹² The positive correlation between a woman's age and rightward voting raises questions about the electoral prospects of young women who currently lean progressive, many of whom might adopt more conservative views in the future. This could foreshadow a growing far-right constituency as today's progressive young women reconsider their political bearings.

YOUNG WOMEN ARE MORE POLARISED

The Gen Z political divide is an emerging field of study that still raises many unanswered questions. There is significant cross-country variation, with national contexts shaping distinct gender dynamics. In some countries, such as in the UK, both genders are moving leftwards, albeit with young women doing so faster.¹⁵ In others, such as Spain, both are shifting to the right, but more strongly among young men.¹⁴ Elsewhere, patterns diverge sharply by gender, while in others no major division can be found.¹⁵ Moreover, gender divides in political attitudes do not necessarily translate into ideological fault lines,

Figure 1


BOTH YOUNG WOMEN AND YOUNG MEN HAVE INCREASED THEIR FAR-RIGHT VOTE



Note: The line shows the mean country-level far-right vote shares for under- and over-30-year-olds each year. Countries missing a year are excluded for that year. Source: Created by Javier Carbonell with ESS data.

THE FAR-RIGHT GENDER DIVIDE IS SMALLER FOR OLDER PEOPLE

Share of vote for far-right parties by gender and age in the 2024 European elections



Note: While men of all age groups vote more for the far-right than women, older women vote more for the far-right than younger women.
Source: Created by Javier Carbonell with data from the European Elections Survey.

nor do either map neatly onto voting behaviour. Lastly, different datasets, including the Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey and national surveys, often point in similar directions – but sometimes diverge.¹⁶

Despite this diversity, a pattern of increasing polarisation among young women can be identified. While some young men continue to vote for the left, their overall rightward shift is substantial enough to permit generalisation: as a group, young men are now positioned on the right. This is not true for young women. According to European Elections Study (EES) data, the average ideological mean of young men is 5.50, slightly to the right of the centre (5), whereas young women's average 4.83, placing them left-of-centre.¹⁷

While the far right's appeal is largely unidirectional among young men, young women are being pulled towards both extremes.

At the same time, the far right is enjoying a strong electoral moment,¹⁸ and an increasing number of young women are voting for them. Taken alongside the leftward trend of many young women, this points to growing polarisation within this group. EES data confirm this interpretation: the standard deviation of ideological positioning is higher for young women than for any other

age or gender group.¹⁹ In short, while the far right's appeal is largely unidirectional among young men, young women are being pulled towards both extremes. A majority move left, but a significant minority also turn to the right.²⁰

This dynamic is most evident in France, which now hosts the most ideologically polarised cohort of young women in Europe.²¹ This is likely linked to the presence of a long-standing and highly visible female far-right leader in Marine Le Pen, who has played a central role in narrowing the traditional gender gap in far-right voting.²² More broadly, far-right parties across Europe are eroding what was once a pronounced gender split in their electorates by increasing their share of women voters.²³


AFTER A LEFT-WING SHIFT, MANY YOUNG WOMEN ARE REVERTING RIGHT

In several European countries, the leftward trend among young women has slowed and, in some cases, begun to reverse. Spain is the prime example (Figure 3). The leftward shift among young women began around 2010 and accelerated between 2016 and 2021, coinciding with the #MeToo movement and the massive 2018 International Women's Day strike.²⁴ From around 2022 onwards, however, this trajectory has stalled and begun to move in the opposite direction.²⁵ While young men are still the main sociodemographic group shifting right, in very recent years, young women are also moving in that direction.

This reversal is also visible in attitudes towards feminism. Feminist identification has been identified as a key driver of women's leftward political movement.²⁶ While the

Figure 3

SPANISH YOUNG WOMEN ARE ALSO MOVING TO THE RIGHT



Note: 1 = far left, 10 = far right and 5.5 = centre.

Source: Created by Javier Carbonell with data from the CIS.

2016–2018 period saw a sharp increase in the number of individuals identifying as feminists, since 2022, that self-description has declined across all age groups and genders, including among young women.²⁷ Moreover, support for the “fight for gender equality” has declined among all young people between 2019 and 2023.²⁸ Such a decline might be expected among young men turning to the far right, but it is particularly striking among young women, a group traditionally seen as among the strongest beneficiaries and supporters of feminism.

These developments signal that the rightward turn among Europe’s youth cannot be understood as a men-only phenomenon. Young women are increasingly pulled in diverging ideological directions: while most are moving left, a growing minority is shifting rightwards, including to the far right. This matters politically because it signals that support for gender equality and liberal democracy is weakening even among a group that has historically been among the most supportive.

Why the shift?

While the leftward shift among young women has received significant attention, far less work has focused on why growing numbers of young women reject feminism and increasingly vote for the far right. One widely cited explanation points to the role of social media algorithms, which often expose users to polarising and extreme content.²⁹ Online social spaces are not neutral agoras where all views circulate equally; far-right content is often well-funded by actors seeking to promote their ideas.³⁰

While widely studied,³¹ this supply-side explanation does not clarify why such content resonates with young people, and with young women in particular.³² Moreover, most research on the subject focuses on visible producers of far-right content – such as tradwife influencers or female far-right party activists – rather than on viewers or voters.³³ As a result, much more is known about the supply of extremist content than about the demand for it.

To better understand why so many young women support radical-right parties, this paper examines three interrelated factors: the broader socially conservative wave, the labour market dissatisfaction and the far right’s ability to politicise that dissatisfaction.³⁴

THE SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE WAVE

To a certain extent, the reasons why more young women vote for the far right are not fundamentally different from why the rest of society does so. Across advanced democracies, a socially conservative wave has been sweeping across political, cultural and behavioural spheres.

This shift is often captured by right-wing circles that claim the ‘death of woke’, describing the decline of positive discrimination, progressive identity politics, gender equality, environmentalism, and trans rights.³⁵ British TV personality and tabloid editor Piers Morgan’s latest book,

titled *Woke Is Dead: How Common Sense Triumphed in an Age of Total Madness* (2025), says it all.³⁶ The diagnosis, embraced by many analysts, is that many progressive and mainstream parties are 'too culturally left'.³⁷

Among younger generations, this trend is visible in changing values and practices. Gen Z are showing higher levels of religious identification and engagement than earlier generations. Baptisms among 18- to 25-year-olds in France have more than quadrupled in the last four years, according to data from the Catholic Church in France.³⁸ Pew Research Center shows that Gen Z is about as religious as older peers.³⁹ *The Economist* analysed findings from the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Centre and found that Zoomers are the only generation not losing their religious affiliation.⁴⁰ Moreover, according to The Knot Worldwide's 2025 Global Wedding Report, weddings among Gen Z are surging in countries like Spain, Brazil and India.⁴¹ The Observatory of Religious Pluralism in Spain reveals that evangelical Christianity has become the religion with the second-most places of worship in the country.⁴²

Fashion trends also point towards a renewed appeal of tradition, emphasising less colourful clothing, simpler silhouettes and so-called 'old money' aesthetics.⁴³ The virality of the 'cottagecore' trend also points in this direction.⁴⁴ Online spaces play a role in translating this shift into gendered narratives. A panoply of creators promote tradwife content and traditional femininity, beauty, domestic skills and a range of clearly defined gender roles.⁴⁵

Young women are not insulated from broader social shifts and today feminism is increasingly counterbalanced by a broader socially conservative drift.

There is also a clear backlash against environmental measures. Farmers' protests against green policies swept across Europe in 2024; far-right parties opposing climate action increased their vote share; the EU has diluted various elements of its climate agenda; and the Green New Deal has clearly slipped down Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's list of priorities.⁴⁶ The same goes for migration. Anti-migrant sentiment has become increasingly mainstream,⁴⁷ and parties now compete less on whether to strengthen borders and limit migration and more on how far to go.⁴⁸

The result is that electoral support for the far right is growing worldwide, while the left keeps losing out, including in large countries like Germany, and the US.⁴⁹

The reasons are varied, but a recurring explanation is a fading sense of community.⁵⁰ Processes of individualisation and social atomisation, which were

aggravated during Covid-19 lockdowns, left many people, particularly the young, with fewer sources of community and care. In this context, the far right provides a sense of belonging, identity and purpose that other political forces have been unable to match.

How is this trend affecting young women? The first and most obvious way is that young women are not insulated from broader social shifts. While feminism and gender equality continue to pull many towards progressive positions, these forces coexist with, and are increasingly counterbalanced by, a broader socially conservative drift.

Second, as issues such as distrust of political elites, nationalism, immigration control, and security concerns come to dominate public discourse, voters are more likely to prioritise these themes at the ballot box.⁵¹ Therefore, as feminism loses salience, young women may base their voting decisions more on positions related to migration or security rather than gender equality, which can benefit far-right parties.

Third, political change often produces backlash. Social movements follow cycles of growth, institutionalisation, decline and, often, countermobilisation. The feminist movement starting with #MeToo sparked mass mobilisation, policy uptake across many parties, prioritisation in the European Commission and discourse at the individual level for millions. However, like any movement, feminism raised hopes and expectations that cannot be rapidly met given the deep social roots of gender inequality.⁵² This, in turn, might disillusion many young women who see the gap between aspirational rhetoric and reality.

Moreover, feminism has produced a countermovement among those who perceive their social privileges as under threat.⁵³ There is growing evidence that advances in gender equality, particularly when entrenched into law, provoke resistance.⁵⁴ For many, particularly young men, feminism 'has gone too far'.⁵⁵ Once feminism became part of official structures, policies and discourse, and governmental agendas it was reframed by its opponents as excessive or coercive. Trans rights, abortion rights and gender equality policies are now being rolled back in many European countries: Bulgaria's courts ruled the Istanbul Convention on Violence Against Women unconstitutional;⁵⁶ Poland imposed a near-total abortion ban;⁵⁷ and Sweden scrapped its self-described feminist foreign policy.⁵⁸ The result is an anti-feminist backlash that does not repel young women but, paradoxically, also attracts many of them.

ECONOMIC PRECARITY

While many gender inequalities persist (particularly regarding gender-based violence), the advancement of women – especially young women – is remarkable.⁵⁹ Once unable to attend university, women now surpass men by over 13% in university graduation rates (Figure 4). Once unable to buy a house or possess wealth in their own name, they are now achieving financial independence.⁶⁰ The change is so significant that the

gender pay gap among the young has reversed, with women under 25 now earning more than young men in most Western European countries.⁶¹

However, this progress has occurred alongside a steep decline in the income, wealth and purchasing power of young people in general. In other words, while young women have gained economic independence, what they can buy with it has diminished. Housing is a key example. It is the largest household expense in the EU, the share of which has only increased in recent years;⁶² since 2010, house prices have risen by 47% and rents by 18%, outpacing inflation.⁶³ The burden falls disproportionately on low-income households, urban residents and young people. As Figure 5 shows, home ownership in Europe has declined mainly among the young. In Southern Europe, many do not leave their parents' homes until after 30, meaning they gain independence when they are no longer considered young.⁶⁴ Today, housing acts as a regressive tax on the young and poor, who must pay older, wealthier property owners for a place to live.


While young women have gained economic independence, what they can buy with it has diminished.

Young people's wealth and income have also declined compared to previous generations. In Spain, for example, the wealth gap between those under 35 and those over 65 has multiplied by nine since 2002.⁶⁵ A study found that between 2008 and 2017, European young adults' incomes fell behind those of older generations, even in countries where youth employment increased.⁶⁶ Social mobility has also worsened, making it far harder for working-class youth to move up the social ladder than in previous generations.⁶⁷

These trends are partly due to the rise in inequality in the West.⁶⁸ As income from capital outpaces income from work, wealthy individuals – who tend to be older, having had more time to accumulate assets – become richer at the expense of the working class and younger populations. Moreover, the 2008 and 2020 crises particularly affected young people, increasing the prevalence of part-time and precarious jobs in Europe, which are disproportionately held by the young.⁶⁹ One-fourth of all temporary contracts are held by the young, with the highest share of temporary workers in this category being in Portugal (40%), Spain (39%) and Italy (38%).⁷⁰


Childcare is also a major issue. The cost of having a child has increased greatly in recent decades, and the age of the first birth has also constantly risen.⁷¹ While an ever-greater number of women do not wish to have children at all, surveys show that the vast majority still wish to be mothers.⁷² However, the main reason many women have fewer children than they desire is linked to economic precarity and instability.⁷³ The widening fertility gap is a consequence of this precarity.

Figure 4



Source: Created by Javier Carbonell with Eurostat data.

YOUNG PEOPLE HAVE LESS ACCESS TO HOUSING THAN BEFORE



Note: The following countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia.

Source: EIB calculations based on European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC).

In 1929, Virginia Woolf famously published *A Room of One's Own*, a feminist reflection arguing that “a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction”, an example of the resources needed for women’s talents to flourish and how society denied them. Today, most young women in Europe can afford to rent a room of their own; the problem is that, for many, this is the *only thing* they can afford.

This means that many young women share with young men a deep dissatisfaction with the current labour market. Many young people feel that the established path to progress in life, of getting an education and working hard, simply does not pay off.⁷⁴ This perception has deep social and political consequences.

The main social consequence is the desire to escape the labour force. As the benefits (e.g. a house, a family, stability, holidays) of participating in the job market are increasingly scarce, many young people do not actively pursue a career.⁷⁵ This helps explain the popularisation in social media of terms like ‘quiet quitting’ (when an employee does not outright quit but does the bare minimum to avoid getting fired) or ‘lazy girl jobs’ (jobs with good pay where career ambition is not important), and the prominence of work–life balance discussions among Gen Z.⁷⁶ It also explains the appeal of social media, influencer and content creator work – all of which promise young people a way to get rich quick.⁷⁷

These consequences can be gendered. Among young men, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have become very common investments, even spawning an entire subculture of ‘cryptobros’.⁷⁸ Among young women, the explosion of OnlyFans, a subscription-based pornographic website, is noteworthy. Data shows that OnlyFans has 377.5 million users and 4.6 million content creators,⁷⁹ most of whom are young women offering sexual content for money, lured by the promise of higher

earnings than those of common employment.⁸⁰ Both the lazy girl jobs narrative and the explosion of OnlyFans can feed into the social conservative wave: the former deprioritises the formal labour market for women (which can increase the perceived value of traditional family roles) and the latter reproduces patriarchal gender norms in which women are valued foremost for their sexual appeal.⁸¹

The nostalgic appeal of not having to work

Dissatisfaction with labour-market outcomes increasingly translates into extreme distrust of the political system. For many young people, political change no longer appears capable of delivering meaningful policy change or better living conditions. One of the most worrying consequences is a decline in support for democracy among young people, with authoritarian alternatives gaining traction.⁸² While many still endorse democracy in principle, studies show that growing numbers believe they no longer live in a real democracy.⁸³ When democracy promises responsiveness but fails to deliver, many dismiss it as merely nominal. This disillusionment creates fertile ground for far-right parties claiming they alone can restore ‘true’ democracy by overturning the system.⁸⁴

This discontent is expressed differently across genders. As explored in my previous report, “*From Provider to Precarious: How young men’s economic decline fuels the anti-feminist backlash*”, among young men, an overall rightward shift is rooted in a nostalgia for a perceived past of economic security. Young men have experienced a decline in income, wealth and purchasing power, and many contrast their situation with that of their fathers and grandfathers when, they believe, stable employment and a family wage were more attainable – for men.⁸⁵ Thus, many young men view social progress as undermining their former privileges and react virulently against it.⁸⁶

Among women, feminism has become a channel into political engagement, linking labour-market precarity to structural gender inequalities. Extensive research underpins these critiques: women experience higher pressure to perform compared to their male counterparts, hiring difficulties linked to pregnancy, glass ceilings, exclusion from informal 'boys' club' promotion networks,⁸⁷ and disproportionate burdens of unpaid household tasks like childcare and emotional labour.⁸⁸ For many, feminism links current malaise to centuries of discrimination, and thus motivates young women to fight patriarchal structures as a way to improve material conditions.

Yet feminist transformation is slow, uneven and often frustrating. This helps to explain why nostalgia also attracts many young women. While men often idealise a past in which the 'labour market worked', women's nostalgic fantasy centres on a time when they did not have to work. The nostalgia focuses on a time when they were outside the labour market entirely and thanks to being married, avoided the obligation of working, lived in 'larger houses', had time for themselves and were shielded from precarity. Thus, while dissatisfaction with the labour market drives some women against patriarchy, it creates on others a desire to escape from work altogether and recuperate some of the perceived benefits of traditional gender roles.

This sentiment was captured in a viral 2022 video of a young woman asking through tears: "Whoever fought for women to get jobs, why? Why did you do that? I am so tired, I just want to put my feet up, oh my god".⁸⁹ The video resonated widely because it articulated the nostalgia for a time when women did not (or rather, were not allowed to) participate in the unsatisfactory reality of today's work environment. It also helps explain the popularity of tradwife content, which presents an idealised version of a past in which women could devote their time to tending their gardens, cooking delicious meals, and spending time with loved ones. Compared to today's strain of balancing precarious work with care responsibilities, this imaginary holds obvious appeal.

In reality, few young women drawn to these narratives would prefer to return to a period in which they could not open a bank account, study or vote. Domestic labour remains intensive and undervalued, economic dependence on a man carries serious risks, and past tolerance of gender-based violence is rarely acknowledged. A great deal of this conservative narrative's appeal rests on what scholar Eviane Leidig terms "general amnesia", the erasure of deep social inequalities of the past.⁹⁰ Feminist critics rightly flag that tradwife influencers themselves depend on long hours of paid digital labour that provides an income source independent of their husband.

However, falsehood does not make the idealised nostalgic projects any less appealing. Nostalgia is powerful not because it accurately describes the past but because it stresses what is wrong with the present. It feeds a politically potent anti-establishment sentiment, which,

combined with the sense that feminism and gender equality now form part of an unresponsive establishment, makes a powerful argument in support of the anti-establishment forces of the far right.

THE FAR RIGHT'S STRATEGY

The far right is responsive to this reality, adapting its messages to attract more women. Three main strategies stand out in this regard:

- 1. Promoting female figureheads**, such as Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National), Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d'Italia) or Alice Weidel (Alternative für Deutschland).⁹¹ Given that greater representation of women in positions of power is a long-standing demand of gender-equality movements,⁹² this strategy allows far-right parties to appear responsive by electing female leaders. This rarely involves addressing structural inequalities within party organisations. Rather, the selection of token leaders is meant to fend off accusation of sexism, homophobia or racism – a strategy also applied through the nomination of LGBT or non-white candidates. This tokensation enhances social acceptability for voters, including young women.⁹³
- 2. Appropriating feminist concerns in exclusivist and nationalist frameworks.** Central to this tactic is femonationalism, which blames migrant populations for violence against women.⁹⁴ In this narrative, Western societies, and Western men, are said to value gender equality, while men from non-Western, particularly Muslim-majority, societies are portrayed as its primary opponents and perpetrators of violence against women.⁹⁵ This transforms gender equality from a structural issue concerning men and women into a civilisational conflict between Western women and 'foreign' men. In doing so, it fractures feminism by recognising women's rights rhetorically while using them in service of – or even subordinating them to – nationalist and anti-immigration objectives.
- 3. Reconcile traditional femininity with contemporary realities.** Far-right female leaders embody the 'superwoman' archetype: simultaneously feminine, professional, and apparently able to balance household duties with a career.⁹⁶ While feminism criticises the amount of personal, professional and aesthetic pressures put on women, the far right valorises them as virtues. The far right openly promotes feminine aesthetics, family values, motherhood and selected traditional roles, while simultaneously endorsing women's participation in the labour market and showcasing women in senior party positions. By apparently embracing women's social advancement while rejecting critiques of patriarchy or male dominance, far-right parties claim to be pro-women without challenging the gender order.

To be sure, many far-right leaders live lives that seem to contradict their ideologies. AfD leader Alice Weidel is in a relationship with Sara Bossard, a woman of

Sri Lankan origin; Giorgia Meloni is a Catholic who never married the father of her daughter; and Le Pen, a self-declared non-practising Catholic, is twice divorced.⁹⁷ Rather than negatively impacting them, these inconsistencies are read by many as representing the balance between tradition and modernity: an embrace of family, motherhood and femininity that

many (wrongly) claim feminism does not allow, combined with the benefits of women's freedom and economic security. Instead of stressing the structural problems facing women, these leaders present liberal versions of womanhood that fit neatly within the social conservative wave currently underway.

Recommendations

RESPOND TO BACKLASHES

Mainstream parties and civil society must press forward with the feminist agenda. Moderation in this regard would only embolden critics while offering nothing substantial or concrete to supporters. Feminism, like any other social movement, must articulate a positive vision for transforming society and set realistic expectations that meaningful change will occur. If mainstream parties, particularly those on the centre-right, moderate their gender equality commitments, supporters will be disappointed, and the movement will become less attractive to younger generations.⁹⁸ An abandonment of the gender equality agenda would not only be unjust; it would be an electoral mistake.⁹⁹

Preventing young women from voting for the far right depends less on gender-focused interventions than on tackling economic insecurity, the housing crisis and declining democratic standards.

However, the shift of many young women to the right is largely tied to a broader turn towards social conservatism. Preventing young women from voting for the far right depends less on gender-focused interventions than on tackling economic insecurity, the housing crisis and declining democratic standards.

Abundant evidence suggests that accommodation of the far right is also not an effective response.¹⁰⁰ While doing so can prove a successful electoral strategy in specific situations, the long-term effects for mainstream parties are public disillusionment and increased electoral support for the far right.¹⁰¹ Adversarial responses that stress democratic values should be prioritised. The green backlash must be met head-on, alongside a robust defence of the transition's security, economic, health and long-term upside. In a similar vein, the terms of the debate on migration must be shifted away from security and scarcity toward economic benefit, demographic need and humanitarian responsibility. Moreover, it is

crucial to communicate that LGBTIQ+ and trans rights pose no threat to 'traditional' families or to women but rather expand individual freedoms. Furthermore, pro-democratic forces must emphasise the need to curb the power of tech billionaires and redistribute the enormous concentration of wealth through regulation and taxation.

In addition, democratic backlash should be addressed. Far-right actors such as Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán often claim to speak in the name of democracy or 'the will of the people', but frequently centralise their control over state institutions.¹⁰² Standing up for democracy and confronting the far right is not only morally right but can also be an effective vote-winning approach, as it can mobilise a broad coalition of voters that oppose authoritarianism. The "No Kings" and "ICE Out" protests in the US, or the pride parade in Hungary, for example, clearly confronted their far-right governments and were some of the most massive protests in both countries.¹⁰³

In this regard, it is worth noting that social and political dynamics often swing like a pendulum. Ten years ago, discussions centred on how progressive the youth vote was; today, they are about the success of the far right among young people.¹⁰⁴ In 10 years, the subject of debates will likely change again because young people follow social trends more than any other age group.¹⁰⁵ Yet, while political cycles come and go, their duration and their impact are determined by the political actions taken. Instead of caving to backlash, democratic forces should mount a strong defence of democracy and gender equality.

TACKLE ECONOMIC PRECARITY

A crucial starting point for improving the economic prospects of young women is to address the wider economic stagnation radicalising their generation.

The EU and member states should pursue bold housing reforms that enable young adults to live independently. That means dramatically scaling up residential construction through both public and private financing, implementing rent caps in major cities, limiting the number of tourist-oriented short-term rentals, and greatly increasing the supply of social housing.¹⁰⁶ Although housing remains largely a national competence, European institutions could play a stronger coordinating role. The new Commissioner for Energy and Housing

should direct more Cohesion Fund resources towards affordable housing, allow cities to access these funds directly rather than through regional bodies, and revise state-aid regulations so that social housing benefits a broader segment of the population, not only those narrowly classified as ‘disadvantaged’.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, housing affordability indicators should be integrated into the European Semester to ensure that housing costs stay proportionate to household incomes.¹⁰⁸

Improving employment security, wages and long-term wealth accumulation for younger generations is equally important. A major tool in this effort is the European Youth Guarantee, which promises every person under 25 a job offer, continued education, an apprenticeship, or a traineeship within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving school.¹⁰⁹ The EU should also ban unpaid internships, ensuring work experience never substitutes paid employment.¹¹⁰

Addressing intergenerational inequality also requires a direct response to wealth concentration. Introducing a system of universal inheritance could help redistribute wealth from older groups to younger and financially vulnerable Europeans.¹¹¹ Under such a scheme, young adults would receive a one-off endowment – typically between ages 18 and 25 – linked to projects of economic, cultural or social value. Financed through progressive taxation on large property holdings, this approach would narrow the wealth gap and inject new spending and investment into the economy by empowering young adults.¹¹²

Economic insecurity also exacerbates barriers to starting families. Although workplaces have modernised, childcare support systems remain stuck in the past. Extending paternity leave is a key solution: EU states should follow Spain’s example by offering both parents 16 weeks of fully paid, non-transferable leave, which encourages fathers to share care responsibilities.¹¹³ Flexible schedules and telework options would further reduce the pressure on parents.¹¹⁴ These measures would ease the disproportionate burden on women, reshape cultural expectations surrounding caregiving and support a more equal distribution of unpaid work – making family formation more attainable for younger generations.

IMPOSE SOCIAL MEDIA BANS

Social media platforms are the main arenas in which radical and extremist content circulates and a channel through which many young people are exposed to radicalisation. Content moderation typically relies on a combination of deplatforming (removing accounts), demonetising (cutting off revenue streams), and demotion or ‘shadow banning’ (reducing the visibility of certain content through algorithms).¹¹⁵ These tools have shown mixed but tangible effects;¹¹⁶ however, they depend on the willingness of tech companies to implement them – a condition that is increasingly objected.¹¹⁷

Since Elon Musk’s takeover of X and Trump’s return to the White House, major tech companies have been emboldened to resist content moderation.¹¹⁸ As a result, European action will have to proceed despite, rather than alongside, tech giants.

The EU has already approved two regulatory tools. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) provide a broad framework for regulating platforms, including increased transparency on algorithms and advertising practices.¹¹⁹ However, enforcement has lagged. Resistance from platforms and pushback from Washington has constrained implementation.¹²⁰ Similarly, the European Democracy Shield contains proposals to counter disinformation and foreign interference, but suffers from insufficient funding.¹²¹ Thus, enforcement and resourcing matter more than new declarations.

Arguments alone will not reverse the anti-feminist trend; collective action is needed.

Beyond general moderation, restricting children’s access to social media platforms should become a central pillar of EU policy. The damages associated by early use – ranging from dopamine addiction to exposure to harmful or radicalising content – are well documented.¹²² Australia recently imposed such a ban for under 16-year-olds, several European countries signed the Jutland Declaration on online child protection, and some countries, such as France or Spain, are implementing the bans.¹²³ While debates on competence and legal design between the EU and member states are ongoing,¹²⁴ this measure should not be delayed.

Social media platforms are at the core of a highly concentrated technology industry. This concentration has enabled the emergence of a tech oligarchy with growing political influence, as Musk’s control over X exemplifies. Competition and antitrust laws should be used to curb their expansion to all areas of the value chain.¹²⁵ Reducing the power of Big Tech is a prerequisite for better regulation.

SHIFT DISCOURSE AND ORGANISATION

Effective responses to the shift to the right should consider all genders, including young women. Policies targeting young men, such as presenting a positive discourse around masculinity, funding initiatives that help more men into Healthcare, Education, Arts and Literacy (HEAL) jobs, placing greater emphasis on young men in the media and cultural initiatives as part of the next EU Gender Equality Strategy, and supporting the creation of centres dedicated to redefining masculinity,

such as Plural in Barcelona, will also indirectly benefit young women.¹²⁶ Moreover, initiatives to combat gender stereotypes should also target expectations around masculinity that many, including young women, still hold. Gender equality initiatives should thus focus on both genders and, crucially, on their interactions.

Another key insight advanced here is that far-right and anti-feminist narratives are no longer fringe. These discourses are common in legacy media and policy, as the far right governs or has participated in the governments of many European countries. According to Amnesty International, 73% of Gen Z social media users report seeing misogynistic content online, and about half encounter it weekly.¹²⁷ Among the young, anti-feminism is not just normal; it is the dominant discourse they consume.

Therefore, gender equality movements targeting young people should adopt a counter-hegemonic, anti-establishment strategy. This means treating the far right as part of the establishment, scrutinising its failures and proposing alternatives. Earlier tactics such as deplatforming or non-engagement are likely to be less effective because many far-right influencers now command larger audiences than their progressive counterparts. Engaging them directly, including through debate on their platforms, can expose audiences to perspectives they would not otherwise encounter. Among younger cohorts, discussing the far right does

Conclusion

The far-right trend among young people is not limited to young men, as the media often portrays it. A significant portion of young women are also voting for the far right and rejecting feminism. Young women are also more polarised than young men, drifting towards both the far left and the far right. Therefore, addressing the anti-feminist trend among the young requires looking at both genders, not just young men. While the impact of social media and the general social conservative wave are important explanations for these developments, a deep dissatisfaction with the labour market is the root cause.

The positive news is that this rightward shift is not set in stone. High levels of distrust, electoral volatility, party dealignment and rapidly shifting social trends mean that young people often hold contradictory views and remain open to movements that speak directly to their lived experiences. While the impact of social media and the broader social conservative wave are important explanations for these developments, a deep dissatisfaction with the labour market, affordability and housing are the root causes. Most young people do not vote for the far right because they are staunch supporters but simply because they present the strongest anti-establishment option. As Zohran Mamdani's New York Mayoral win demonstrates, a

not legitimise its views given that those opinions are already normalised. Instead, engagement may create space for contestation.

Anti-feminism should therefore be framed as the establishment position and countered with a transformative feminist agenda that articulates tangible social and economic alternatives rather than defensive claims.

Lastly, it is important to note that support for the far right is riven by structural conditions. While confronting radical ideas matters, discursive strategies alone are insufficient. The deterioration of material conditions undermines belonging, purpose and self-worth at a formative stage in young people's lives. This is precisely the gap that the social-conservative wave fills: it offers community amid atomisation and identity amid uncertainty.

One of the historic strengths of the feminist movements has been their organisational capacity: the creation of support groups, safe spaces, shared experiences and new connections.¹²⁸ Rebuilding this infrastructure is essential. Creating spaces for socialisation, activism and sustained engagement can foster collective agency and durable commitment. Engaged institutions and pro-democratic political forces can help provide such spaces.¹²⁹ Arguments alone will not reverse the anti-feminist trend; collective action is needed.

democratic campaign centred on affordability can mobilise young voters across genders: Mamdani secured an impressive 84% of the vote among women under 29, as well as 68% among young men.¹³⁰

While it is true that the far right is gaining support among young voters, it is equally true that young people are among the most vocal advocates for green policies, wealth redistribution, social mobility, fairer foreign policy and gender equality. This coexistence of frustration and idealism suggests not a generation lost to reactionary politics, but one searching for credible alternatives – ready to rally behind inclusive, forward-looking projects that offer material security, dignity and a more just future.

The positive news is that this rightward shift is not set in stone. A democratic campaign centred on affordability can mobilise young voters of both genders.

- 1 Tarik Abou-Chadi, «A Gendered Far-Right Wave among Young Voters in Western Europe?», *European Journal of Politics and Gender*, 13 de diciembre de 2024, 1-6, <https://doi.org/10.1332/25151088Y2024D000000065>; Đorđe Milosav et al., «The Youth Gender Gap in Support for the Far Right», *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24 de marzo de 2025, 1-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2481181>.
- 2 The author would like to thank Corina Stratulat, Jessica Moss and Konstantina Karkavitsa for their help in writing this paper.
- 3 Peter Egge Langsæther y Carl Henrik Knutsen, «Are Women More Progressive than Men? Attitudinal Gender Gaps in West European Democracies», *International Political Science Review* 46, n.o 3 (2025): 442-53, <https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121241280069>.
- 4 Giovanni Coi, «Mapped: Europe's Rapidly Rising Right», POLITICO (Brussels), 24 de mayo de 2024, <https://www.politico.eu/article/mapped-europe-far-right-government-power-politics-eu-italy-finalnd-hungary-parties-elections-polling/>; Vicente Valentim, *The Normalization of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand*, Oxford Studies in Democratization Series (Oxford University Press, 2024).
- 5 Javier Carbonell, *From Provider to Precarious: How Young Men's Economic Decline Fuels the Anti-Feminist Backlash* (European Policy Centre, 2025).
- 6 Maria Psara y Nikos Michos, «Young People Disproportionately Affected by the EU's Housing Crisis», My-Europe_europe-News, *Euronews* (Brussels), 16:21:54 +02:00, 146720, <http://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/13/young-people-are-disproportionately-affected-by-the-eus-housing-crisis>; Kiko Llaneras, «¿Jóvenes contra 'boomers'? Cuatro gráficos para entender la tensión generacional», La Newsletter de Kiko Llaneras, *El País*, 20 de septiembre de 2025, <https://elpais.com/espana/2025-09-20/jovenes-contra-boomers-cuatro-graficos-para-entender-la-tension-generacional.html>.
- 7 Analysis of other genders fall outside the scope of this paper.
- 8 Antoine Bristelle et al., *How Young People Facing Disadvantage View Democracy in Europe*, Builders of Progress (FEPS: Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2024).
- 9 tagesschau.de, «Bundestagswahl 2025: Stimmanteile bei 18-24-Jährigen | tagesschau.de.», tagesschau.de, 23 de febrero de 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2025-02-23-BT-DE/charts/umfrage-afd/chart_1862361.shtml.
- 10 John Burn-Murdoch [@jburnmurdoch], «The youth gender divide is real and important, but it can mask the fact that the populist right is gaining ground among young women as well as young men in many countries. AfD tripled their vote share among 18-24 year old men, but the same was true of young women. <https://t.co/9bab6NPOsC>», Tweet, *Twitter*, 24 de febrero de 2025, <https://x.com/jburnmurdoch/status/1894052093024965014>.
- 11 Abou-Chadi, «A Gendered Far-Right Wave among Young Voters in Western Europe?»
- 12 NCSR, «Traditional Gender Norms Remain Strong but Younger and More Educated Groups Show Signs of Change», National Centre for Social Research, 3 de noviembre de 2025, <https://natcen.ac.uk/news/traditional-gender-norms-remain-strong-younger-and-more-educated-groups-show-signs-change>.
- 13 Emilia Belknap y Stuart Turnbull-Dugarte, «Most British Young Men Reject the Far Right», *UK in a Changing Europe*, 30 de octubre de 2025, <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/most-british-young-men-reject-the-far-right/>; Pablo de la Serna, «Por qué la ultraderecha es más hábil en colar su discurso antifeminista entre los hombres jóvenes», *Mujer, Público*, 23 de mayo de 2025, <https://www.publico.es/mujer/ultraderecha-habil-colar-discurso-antifeminista-hombres-jovenes.html>.
- 14 Borja Andriño y Pablo Ordaz, «Los jóvenes son más de derechas que nunca. Estas son sus razones», *EPS, El País*, 2 de noviembre de 2025, <https://elpais.com/eps/2025-11-02/los-jovenes-son-mas-de-derechas-que-nunca-estas-son-sus-razones.html>.
- 15 Richard Nennstiel y Ansgar Hudde, «Is There a Growing Gender Divide among Young Adults in Regard to Ideological Left–Right Self-Placement? Evidence from 32 European Countries», *European Sociological Review*, 13 de junio de 2025, jcaf021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaf021>.
- 16 John Burn-Murdoch, «Young women are starting to leave men behind», Data Points, *Financial Times*, 20 de septiembre de 2024, <https://www.ft.com/content/17606f25-1d03-4f37-b7f4-f39989af9bde>; Nennstiel y Hudde, «Is There a Growing Gender Divide among Young Adults in Regard to Ideological Left–Right Self-Placement?»; Gefjon Off, «Gender Equality Salience, Backlash and Radical Right Voting in the Gender-Equal Context of Sweden», *West European Politics* 46, n.o 3 (2023): 451-76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2084986>; Amy Alexander et al., «Young Men, Gendered Labour Market Competition, and Opposition to Gender Equality Policy across 27 EU Countries», *West European Politics*, 7 de agosto de 2025, 1-28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2025.2524908>.
- 17 Author's calculations based on European Elections Study (EES).
- 18 Coi, «Mapped».
- 19 Author's calculations based on European Elections Study (EES).
- 20 Elsa Conesa, «Western Germany Sees the Far-Right AfD Party Increasingly Appeal to Women», *Le Monde*, 1 de octubre de 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/10/01/in-western-germany-the-afd-is-increasingly-appealing-to-women_6745963_4.html.
- 21 Author's calculations based on European Elections Study (EES).
- 22 Hanne Cokelaere y Victor Goury-Laffont, «French Women Voters Swing Sharply to Far Right», *POLITICO*, 21 de junio de 2024, <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-eu-elections-2024-women-vote-far-right-policy-emmanuel-macron-july-7/>; Nonna Mayer, «The impact of gender on votes for the populist radical rights: Marine Le Pen vs. Eric Zemmour», *Modern & Contemporary France* 30, n.o 4 (2022): 445-60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2022.2134328>.
- 23 Mayer, Nonna. 2022. 'The Impact of Gender on Votes for the Populist Radical Rights: Marine Le Pen vs. Eric Zemmour'. *Modern & Contemporary France* 30(4): 445–60. doi:10.1080/09639489.2022.2134328.
- 24 Alabao, Nuria, Beatriz García, and Marisa Pérez. 2018. 'Spain's Feminist Strike'. *New Left Review* (110): 35–38.
- 25 Serna, «Por qué la ultraderecha es más hábil en colar su discurso antifeminista entre los hombres jóvenes»; Andriño y Ordaz, «Los jóvenes son más de derechas que nunca. Estas son sus razones».
- 26 Anna Mardling, *Explained: Gen Z's Growing Gender-Based Political Divide ...*, Young People & Education, 1 de septiembre de 2025, <https://politicsuk.com/gen-z-growing-gender-based-political-divide/>.
- 27 Guillermo Cordero et al., «La brecha ideológica de género en la Generación Z en España», *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 67 (marzo de 2025): 69-99, <https://doi.org/10.21308/recep.67.03>.
- 28 Carles Freixas, *Informe de la Juventud 2025* (Instituto de la Juventud - INJUVE, 2025).
- 29 Betsy Milne y Catherine R. Baker, «From 'villains' to 'idols': exploring teenage boys' conflicting attachments to manospheric masculinities», *Gender and Education* 0, n.o 0 (s. f.): 1-22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2025.2568407>; Emma A. Renström y Hanna Bäck, «Manfluencers and Young Men's Misogynistic Attitudes: The Role of Perceived Threats to Men's Status», *Sex Roles* 90, n.o 12 (2024): 1787-806, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-024-01538-2>.
- 30 Neil Datta, *The Next Wave: How Religious Extremism Is Regaining Power* (European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 2025); Anupriya Datta, «EU Countries Back Child Safety Declaration», *Euractiv*, 10 de octubre de 2025, <https://www.euractiv.com/news/eu-countries-back-child-safety-declaration/>; Theda Skocpol et al., «How the Koch Brothers Built the Most Powerful Rightwing Group You've Never Heard Of», *US News, The Guardian*, 26 de septiembre de 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/26/koch-brothers-americans-for-prosperity-rightwing-political-group>.
- 31 Sally Weale, «Social Media Algorithms Amplifying Misogynistic Content», *Media, The Guardian*, 6 de febrero de 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2024/feb/06/social-media-algorithms-amplifying-misogynistic-content>.
- 32 Milne y Baker, «From 'villains' to 'idols'; Renström y Bäck, «Manfluencers and Young Men's Misogynistic Attitudes».
- 33 Lois Shearing, *Pink-Pilled: Women and the Far Right* (Manchester University Press, 2025); Eviane Leidig, *The Women of the Far Right: Social Media Influencers and Online Radicalization* (Columbia University Press, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.7312/leid21016>.
- 34 Other answers have to do with the transformation of the dating market and what has been called the "dating apps fatigue" but it falls outside of the scope of this report.
- 35 Andrew Doyle, «Is the "woke" Movement Really Over?», *The Spectator*, 1 de junio de 2025, <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-the-woke-movement-really-over/>; Polly Vernon, «Pronouns and Vegan Cafés Are out. So Has Woke Been Cancelled?», *The Times*, 19 de abril de 2024, <https://www.thetimes.com/uk/social-media/article/is-woke-over-cancel-culture-5cb6kl9r>; Michelle Cottle et al., «Opinion |

- The Woke Burnout Is Real – and Politics Is Catching Up», Opinion, *The New York Times*, 7 de septiembre de 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/07/opinion/woke-culture-wars-schools.html>.
- ³⁶ Piers Morgan, *Woke Is Dead: How Common Sense Triumphed in an Age of Total Madness* (HarperCollins, 2025), <https://www.waterstones.com/book/woke-is-dead/piers-morgan/9780008555498>.
- ³⁷ Ezra Klein, «Opinion | Democrats Need to Face Why Trump Won», Opinion, *The New York Times*, 18 de marzo de 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/18/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-david-shor.html>; Ezra Klein, «Opinion | Would Bernie Have Won?», Opinion, *The New York Times*, 26 de noviembre de 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/26/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-faiz-shakir.html>; John Burn-Murdoch, «The left is losing its grip on ethnic minority voters», *Financial Times*, 11 de octubre de 2024.
- ³⁸ Christopher Lamb y Joseph Ataman, «Faith Is a Hit among Gen Z. The Church Might Have Influencers to Thank», *CNN*, 15 de septiembre de 2025, <https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/15/europe/faith-gen-z-catholic-church-influencers-intl-cmd>.
- ³⁹ Christian Paz, «Gen Z Is Finding Religion. Why?», *Vox*, 25 de abril de 2025, <https://www.vox.com/religion/410359/gen-z-zoomer-religion-god-faith-politics-trump-pope>.
- ⁴⁰ The Economist, «America's Gen Z has got religion», *The Economist*, 27 de febrero de 2025, https://www.economist.com/usa/2025/02/27/americas-gen-z-has-got-religion?utm_medium=pcp_adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppcampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&qclsrc=aw.ds&gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=18151761343&gbrad=0AAAAADBUq310rnWhytWrE3g4twUjsM8GE&qclid=Cj0KCOjArOvIBhDLARIsAPwJXOZVBkOwHbJz_p_lghs4ivkQzpk9Gxo2jxCW0QJk3HDSbrhyAR3ELTwaAR53EALw_wCB.
- ⁴¹ The Knot Worldwide, *2025 Global Wedding Report* (The Knot Worldwide, 2025), <https://www.theknot.com/blog/2025-global-wedding-report/>.
- ⁴² Luke Randall, «Evangelicalism on rise and fall in Europe», *evangelicals now*, 2 de diciembre de 2024, <https://www.e-n.org.uk/world-news/2024-12-evangelicalism-on-rise-and-fall-in-europe/>.
- ⁴³ Bethany Miller, «How Fashion Predicted A Trump Triumph», *Style, Evie Magazine*, 9 de abril de 2025, <https://www.eviemagazine.com/post/how-fashion-predicted-a-trump-triumph>; Rodríguez Patricia y García Leticia, «From Quiet Luxury to Prairie Dresses: How Fashion Became Ultra-Conservative», *EL PAÍS English*, 14 de septiembre de 2025, <https://english.elpais.com/lifestyle/2025-09-14/from-quiet-luxury-to-prairie-dresses-how-fashion-became-ultra-conservative.html>; Maliha Shoab, «Why Is Conservative Dressing on the Rise When Modest Fashion Is under Fire?», Tags, *Vogue*, 15 de julio de 2025, <https://www.vogue.com/article/why-is-conservative-dressing-on-the-rise-when-modest-fashion-is-under-fire>.
- ⁴⁴ Anita Rao Kashi, «“Cottagecore” and the Rise of the Modern Rural Fantasy», *BBC*, 9 de diciembre de 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20201208-cottagecore-and-the-rise-of-the-modern-rural-fantasy>.
- ⁴⁵ Rifana Khanum, «The Rise of the “Tradwife” Movement on Social Media - Media Diversity Institute», *Articles, Media Diversity Institute*, 8 de marzo de 2025, <https://www.media-diversity.org/the-rise-of-the-tradwife-movement-on-social-media/>; Carter Sherman, «Sundresses and Rugged Self-Sufficiency: ‘Tradwives’ Tout a Conservative American Past ... That Didn’t Exist», *Life and Style, The Guardian*, 24 de julio de 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/ng-interactive/2024/jul/24/tradwives-tiktok-women-gender-roles>.
- ⁴⁶ Karl Mathiesen, «Ursula von Der Leyen Amputates the Green Deal to Save Its Life», *POLITICO* (Brussels), 25 de junio de 2025, <https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-green-deal-eu-politics-economy-policy/>; Kate Abnett et al., «Main Farming Groups Shun Brussels Protest against EU Green Policies», *Europe, Reuters*, 4 de junio de 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/main-farming-groups-shun-brussels-protest-against-eu-green-policies-2024-06-04/>; Eric Maurice, *Von Der Leyen's Downgraded Priorities: Democracy, Social Issues and Environment* (European Policy Centre, 2025), <https://www.epc.eu/publication/von-der-leyen-downgraded-priorities-democracy-social-issues-and-environment/>.
- ⁴⁷ Tara Varma y Sophie Roehse, *Understanding Europe's Turn on Migration* (Brookings Institution, 2024), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-europes-turn-on-migration/>; Ashifa Kassam, «'Most of This Is Symbolic': The New Wave of Anti-Migrant Vigilantes in Europe», *World News, The Guardian* (London), 30 de agosto de 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/30/europe-anti-migrant-vigilantes-spain-poland-netherlands-iceland-northern-ireland>.
- ⁴⁸ Marc Junyent, «Anti-Migrant Sentiments in Central Europe Move Beyond Middle East Refugees», *DAWN*, 30 de julio de 2025, <https://dawnmena.org/anti-migrant-sentiments-in-central-europe-move-beyond-middle-east-refugees/>.
- ⁴⁹ Joseph Wilson y Helena Alves, «Portugal's Chega Party Becomes the Main Opposition and Joins Europe's Far-Right Surge», *World News, AP News*, 28 de mayo de 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/portugal-politics-chega-far-right-elections-1681e21359a16ea4cd4c38efeeeda0e>; Matthew Polacko, «The rightward shift and electoral decline of social democratic parties under increasing inequality», *West European Politics* 45, n.o 4 (2022): 665-92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1916294>; Petra Wischgoll y Thomas Escritt, «Far-Right's Western Inroads Create Headache for German Coalition», *World, Reuters*, 15 de septiembre de 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/far-rights-western-inroads-create-headache-german-coalition-2025-09-15/>; Mariana S. Mendes, «Late, but swift: the restructuring of Portugal's political space in the May 2025 general election», *South European Society and Politics* 0, n.o 0 (2025): 1-26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2025.2567929>.
- ⁵⁰ Sarah Stein Lubrano, *Don't Talk About Politics: How to Change 21st-Century Minds* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2025), <https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/dont-talk-about-politics-9781399413916/>.
- ⁵¹ Katherine Williams, «Women's Engagement with the Far Right: A Quest for a More Holistic Understanding», *Religion Compass* 18, n.o 5 (2024): e12495, <https://doi.org/10.1111/rec3.12495>.
- ⁵² Paula England, «The Gender Revolution: Uneven and Stalled», *Gender & Society* 24, n.o 2 (2010): 149-66, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243210361475>.
- ⁵³ Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women* (Crown Publishing, 1991); Brian Wheaton, «Laws, Beliefs, and Backlash», *manuscript*, UCLA, Anderson School of Management, 2022.
- ⁵⁴ Carbonell, *From Provider to Precarious: How Young Men's Economic Decline Fuels the Anti-Feminist Backlash*.
- ⁵⁵ Eleanor Pringle, «Majority of Gen Z Men Say Feminism Has Gone Too Far—but BofA Study Says Wealthy Women Lift Entire Economy», *Fortune*, 6 de mayo de 2025, <https://fortune.com/2025/05/06/gen-z-men-feminism-too-far-women-economically-benefit-all-bank-of-america/>.
- ⁵⁶ BIRN, «Bulgaria Court Says 'Istanbul Convention' Violates Constitution», *Balkan Insight*, 27 de julio de 2018, <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/27/bulgaria-s-constitutional-court-says-istanbul-convention-not-in-line-with-basic-law-07-27-2018/>.
- ⁵⁷ BBC, «Poland Enforces Controversial Near-Total Abortion Ban», *BBC*, 28 de enero de 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55838210>.
- ⁵⁸ AFP, «Swedish Government Scraps Country's Pioneering 'Feminist Foreign Policy'», *World News, The Guardian*, 18 de octubre de 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/18/swedish-government-scraps-countrys-pioneering-feminist-foreign-policy>.
- ⁵⁹ EIGE, *Gender Equality Index 2024: Tackling Violence against Women, Tackling Gender Inequalities* (European Institute for Gender Equality, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025), https://eige.europa.eu/publications-resources/publications/gender-equality-index-2024-tackling-violence-against-women-tackling-gender-inequalities?language_content_entity=en.
- ⁶⁰ Carbonell, *From Provider to Precarious: How Young Men's Economic Decline Fuels the Anti-Feminist Backlash*.
- ⁶¹ Carbonell, *From Provider to Precarious: How Young Men's Economic Decline Fuels the Anti-Feminist Backlash*.
- ⁶² Javier Carbonell y Elizabeth Kuiper, *How the EU Should Tackle the Housing Crisis*, *Commentary* (European Policy Centre, 2024), <https://www.epc.eu/publication/How-the-EU-should-tackle-the-housing-crisis-5f7198/>.
- ⁶³ European Commission. Eurostat, *Housing in Europe, Demography of Europe – Statistics Visualised* (Publications Office, 2023), <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2785/279048>.
- ⁶⁴ Eurostat, «Age of Leaving the Parental Home Steady in 2023», 30 de septiembre de 2024, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240930-2>.
- ⁶⁵ José Luis Aranda et al., «La vivienda, imposible para los jóvenes: los precios suben el doble que sus salarios», *Economía, El País* (Madrid), 29 de septiembre de 2024, <https://elpais.com/economia/2024-09-29/la-vivienda-imposible-para-los-jovenes-los-precios-suben-el-doble-que-sus-salarios.html>.
- ⁶⁶ Bernhard Hammer et al., «Age-Specific Income Trends in Europe: The Role of Employment, Wages, and Social Transfers», *Social Indicators Research* 162, n.o 2 (2022): 525-47, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-021-02838-w>.

- ⁶⁷ Yonatan Berman, «The Long-Run Evolution of Absolute Intergenerational Mobility», *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 14, n.o 3 (2022): 61-83, <https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200631>.
- ⁶⁸ Lucas Chancel et al., *World Inequality Report 2022* (World Inequality Lab, 2022), <https://wir2022.wid.world>.
- ⁶⁹ Maria Sironi, «Economic Conditions of Young Adults Before and After the Great Recession», *Journal of Family and Economic Issues* 39, n.o 1 (2018): 103-16, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-017-9554-3>.
- ⁷⁰ Eurostat, «Temporary Employment: Demographics and Parenthood Factors», 17 de mayo de 2023, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230517-2>.
- ⁷¹ Servet Yanatma, «How Do Childcare Costs Vary across Europe?», *Business_economy*, *Euronews*, 24 de agosto de 2025, <http://www.euronews.com/business/2025/08/24/nursery-and-creche-how-much-do-families-spend-on-childcare-across-europe>; *The Brussels Times*, «European Women Becoming Mothers Increasingly Late in Life», *The Brussels Times* (Brussels), 28 de marzo de 2023, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/430415/european-women-becoming-mothers-increasingly-late-in-life>.
- ⁷² Servet Yanatma, «Europe's Fertility Crisis: Which Countries Are Having Fewer Babies?», *Health_health-News*, *Euronews*, 14 de mayo de 2024, <http://www.euronews.com/health/2024/09/28/europes-fertility-crisis-which-european-country-is-having-the-fewest-babies>.
- ⁷³ María Sosa Troya y Noor Mahtani, «La España de la maternidad tardía», *Sociedad*, *El País* (Madrid), 15 de diciembre de 2019, https://elpais.com/sociedad/2019/12/14/actualidad/1576278557_524336.html; Javier G. Jorrín, «En España hay 2,5 millones de mujeres que no han tenido más hijos por la precariedad», *Economía*, *elconfidencial.com*, 9 de abril de 2019, https://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2019-04-09/espana-fertilidad-mujeres-no-tienen-hijos-precariadad_1932226/.
- ⁷⁴ Bristelle et al., *How Young People Facing Disadvantage View Democracy in Europe*.
- ⁷⁵ Jessica Grose, «Opinion | For Gen Z-Ers, Work Is Now More Depressing Than Unemployment», *Opinion*, *The New York Times*, 5 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/opinion/gen-z-work.html>.
- ⁷⁶ Daisy Jones, «Gen Z Want to Work 'Lazy Girl Jobs'. Who Can Blame Them?», *Opinion*, *The Guardian*, 9 de julio de 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jul/09/gen-z-lazy-girl-jobs-tiktok-work>; Jones, «Gen Z Want to Work 'Lazy Girl Jobs'. Who Can Blame Them?»
- ⁷⁷ Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan, «Selling financial freedom: a brash breed of influencers appeal to Gen Z investors», *Financial Times*, 22 de agosto de 2024.
- ⁷⁸ Rohitha Naraharisetty, «How Crypto 'Bro' Culture Around Finance Is the New Toxic Masculinity», *The Swaddle*, 7 de abril de 2022, <https://www.theswaddle.com/how-crypto-bro-culture-around-finance-is-the-new-toxic-masculinity>.
- ⁷⁹ Madeline Berg, «6 OnlyFans Stats That Show How Massive the Platform Has Become», *Business Insider*, 22 de agosto de 2025, <https://www.businessinsider.com/onlyfans-app-surges-creators-users-revenue-owner-leonid-radvinsky-earnings-2025-8>.
- ⁸⁰ Daniel Thomas, «OnlyFans hands record \$701mn dividend to owner ahead of sale», *Financial Times*, 22 de agosto de 2025, <https://www.ft.com/content/7d936956-f1b9-4fe4-b3de-feaddac79953?utm>.
- ⁸¹ L. Monique Ward et al., «Priming, performing, and policing: Social media use and self-sexualization among U.S. White, Black, and Asian-American adolescent girls», *Body Image* 46 (septiembre de 2023): 324-35, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bodyim.2023.06.015>.
- ⁸² Deborah Cole, «Young Europeans Losing Faith in Democracy, Poll Finds», *Society*, *The Guardian*, 4 de julio de 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2025/jul/04/young-europeans-losing-faith-in-democracy-poll-finds>.
- ⁸³ Kilian Wirthwein y Javier Carbonell, *Youth Support for Democracy in Spain: Democracy in the Face of Disadvantage*, Builders of Progress (FEPS: Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2023), <https://feps-europe.eu/publication/youth-support-for-democracy-in-spain/>.
- ⁸⁴ Wirthwein y Carbonell, *Youth Support for Democracy in Spain: Democracy in the Face of Disadvantage*.
- ⁸⁵ Carbonell, *From Provider to Precarious: How Young Men's Economic Decline Fuels the Anti-Feminist Backlash*.
- ⁸⁶ Renström y Bäck, «Manfluencers and Young Men's Misogynistic Attitudes».
- ⁸⁷ Anjali Raval, «Too many women excel at their jobs but are ignored for top roles», *Management*, *Financial Times*, 24 de octubre de 2024, <https://www.ft.com/content/729d1a32-62bf-4d61-b3e3-0763b7fe93ca>; Ho Kwan Cheung et al., «Beyond the Baby Bump: Subtle Discrimination Against Working Mothers In the Hiring Process», *Journal of Business and Psychology* 37, n.o 6 (2022): 1181-98, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-022-09790-7>; Mara Bria et al., «Gender and Pregnancy Discrimination in the Selection Process. Does It (Still) Exist?», *Gender, Work & Organization* n/a, n.o n/a (s. f.), <https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.70039>.
- ⁸⁸ Ashley V. Whillans et al., «The Secret Tax on Women's Time», *TIME*, 25 de enero de 2023, <https://time.com/6249410/secret-tax-women-time/>.
- ⁸⁹ The video can be found here: <https://www.tiktok.com/@taymccomish/video/7241386628906814725?lang=en>.
- ⁹⁰ Leidig, *The Women of the Far Right*.
- ⁹¹ Angelique Chrisafis et al., «From Le Pen to Alice Weidel: How the European Far-Right Set Its Sights on Women», *Life and Style*, *The Guardian*, 29 de enero de 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/jan/29/from-le-pen-to-alice-weidel-how-the-european-far-right-set-its-sights-on-women>.
- ⁹² Sofia Collignon y Minna Cowper-Coles, *Women's political careers 2022* (The Global Institute for Women's Leadership and King's College London, 2023).
- ⁹³ Ana Catalano Weeks et al., «When Do Männerparteien Elect Women? Radical Right Populist Parties and Strategic Descriptive Representation», *American Political Science Review* 117, n.o 2 (2023): 421-38, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000107>.
- ⁹⁴ Sara R. Farris, *In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism* (Duke University Press, 2017).
- ⁹⁵ Servimedia, «Vox vincula violaciones e inmigración y culpa a Marlaska de "traer" a España a los agresores sexuales», *Sociedad*, *La Vanguardia*, 12 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.lavanguardia.com/sociedad/20251112/11257949/vox-vincula-violaciones-e-inmigracion-culpa-marlaska-traer-espana-agresores-sexuales-agenciaslv20251112.html>.
- ⁹⁶ Jennifer Loh et al., *The Superwoman Myth: Can Contemporary Women Have It All Now?* (Routledge, 2022), <https://www.routledge.com/The-Superwoman-Myth-Can-Contemporary-Women-Have-It-All-Now/Loh-Johns-English/p/book/9780367896928>.
- ⁹⁷ Far right men also embody personal contradictions with their politics. Trump and Farage have been married several times, JD Vance is married to a non-Christian woman and Dutch far-right leader Pim Fortuyn Was gay.
- ⁹⁸ Stuart J Turnbull-Dugarte et al., *Accommodating the Radical Right: The Electoral Costs for Social Democratic Parties*, s. f.
- ⁹⁹ Belknap y Turnbull-Dugarte, «Most British Young Men Reject the Far Right».
- ¹⁰⁰ Turnbull-Dugarte et al., *Accommodating the Radical Right: The Electoral Costs for Social Democratic Parties*.
- ¹⁰¹ Muirinkeating, «Denmark's Migration Policy – an Example to Follow?», *UK in a Changing Europe*, 25 de septiembre de 2025, <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/denmarks-migration-policy-an-example-to-follow/>; Tarik Abou-Chadi et al., *Left behind by the working class? Social Democracy's Electoral Crisis and the Rise of the Radical Right*, Future of Democracy (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021); Tarik Abou-Chadi et al., «Parties' policy adjustments in response to changes in issue saliency», *West European Politics* 43, n.o 4 (2020): 749-71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1609296>; Jakob Schwörer y Kristina Birke Daniels, *Cautionary Tale or Model for Success? Social Democrats and Their Migration Policy in Denmark* (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2024).
- ¹⁰² Yashraj Sharma, «'Trump 2028': Could the US President Really Go for a Third Term?», *Al Jazeera*, accedido 19 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/28/trump-2028-could-the-us-president-really-go-for-a-third-term>; Roque Planas, «Nearly All Immigrants Detained in Trump Chicago Raid Had No Criminal Conviction», *US News*, *The Guardian*, 19 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/nov/19/trump-chicago-immigration-raid>; Andrew Chung y John Kruzel, «US Chief Justice Roberts rebukes Trump's attack on judge», *Legal*, *Reuters*, 18 de marzo de 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-chief-justice-roberts-calls-judges-impeachment-are-inappropriate-after-trump-2025-03-18/>; Lindsey Underwood et al., «700 Marines Deploy to L.A. as Trump Mobilizes 2,000 More National Guard Troops», *The Washington Post*, 10 de junio de 2025, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2025/06/09/marines-la-protests/>.

- ¹⁰³ Karl Sexton, «Hungary: Banned Pride March Draws Thousands», *Dw.Com*, 10 de mayo de 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-banned-pride-march-draws-thousands/a-74238309>; Eliza Goodwin y Caitlin Wilson, «Millions Turned out for Anti-Trump “No Kings” Protests across US», *BBC*, 19 de octubre de 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c93xgyp1zv4o>.
- ¹⁰⁴ Nicola Maggini, *Young People's Voting Behaviour in Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59243-9>; Adam Gabbatt, «Millennials “heart” Bernie Sanders: Why the Young and Hip Are #FeelingtheBern», *US News, The Guardian*, 20 de agosto de 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/20/bernie-sanders-millennials-young-voters>.
- ¹⁰⁵ Bristelle et al., *How Young People Facing Disadvantage View Democracy in Europe*.
- ¹⁰⁶ OECD, *Social housing: A key part of past and future housing policy*, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Policy Briefs (OECD, 2020), <http://oe.cd/social-housing-2020>; Andreas Mense, «The Impact of New Housing Supply on the Distribution of Rents», *Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics* 3, n.o 1 (2025): 1-42, <https://doi.org/10.1086/733977>; Konstantin A. Kholodilin, «Rent control effects through the lens of empirical research: An almost complete review of the literature», *Journal of Housing Economics* 63 (marzo de 2024): 101983, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2024.101983>; Joan Monras y José García-Montalvo, «The Impact of Rent Controls: Lessons from Catalonia», *CEPR*, 2 de abril de 2025, <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/impact-rent-controls-lessons-catalonia>.
- ¹⁰⁷ Carbonell y Kuiper, *How the EU Should Tackle the Housing Crisis*.
- ¹⁰⁸ Carbonell y Kuiper, *How the EU Should Tackle the Housing Crisis*.
- ¹⁰⁹ European Youth Forum, «Youth Guarantee», accedido 20 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.youthforum.org/topics/youth-guarantee>.
- ¹¹⁰ European Youth Forum, «No More Unpaid Internships!», accedido 20 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.youthforum.org/topics/no-more-unpaid-internships>.
- ¹¹¹ Javier Carbonell, «A favor de la herencia universal», Opinión, *El País*, 10 de julio de 2023, <https://elpais.com/opinion/2023-07-10/a-favor-de-la-herencia-universal.html>.
- ¹¹² Guillem Vidal et al., «Bridging the Wealth Gap: Simulating Universal Inheritance in Four EU Countries», *Journal of European Social Policy* 35, n.o 2 (2025): 173-88, <https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241311147>.
- ¹¹³ Reuters, «Spain's new parental leave gives fathers one of Europe's most generous allowances», *Reuters*, 29 de julio de 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/spains-new-parental-leave-gives-fathers-one-europes-most-generous-allowances-2025-07-29/>.
- ¹¹⁴ Claudia Goldin et al., «The Parental Pay Gap over the Life Cycle: Children, Jobs, and Labor Supply», *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 169 (diciembre de 2024): 104963, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104963>.
- ¹¹⁵ Dunne, Sarah Anne, et al., «Mainstreaming the Far-Right: Deplatforming, Content Moderation and Far-Right Presence on Mainstream Social Media Sites», en *Disinformation and Polarization in the Algorithmic Society*, vol. 1 (University of Beira Interior and Universidad Icesi, 2024).
- ¹¹⁶ Anh V. Vu et al., «No Easy Way Out: the Effectiveness of Deplatforming an Extremist Forum to Suppress Hate and Harassment», arXiv:2304.07037, preprint, arXiv, 13 de abril de 2024, <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.07037>; Leidig, *The Women of the Far Right*.
- ¹¹⁷ Inti Landauro, «Meta's Content Moderation Contractor to Cut 2,000 Jobs in Barcelona», *Technology, Reuters*, 4 de abril de 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/technology/metas-content-moderation-contractor-cuts-2000-jobs-barcelona-2025-04-04/>.
- ¹¹⁸ Kari Paul, «Reversal of Content Policies at Alphabet, Meta and X Threaten Democracy, Warn Experts», *Media, The Guardian*, 7 de diciembre de 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/dec/07/2024-elections-social-media-content-safety-policies-moderation>.
- ¹¹⁹ Franca Maria Feisel, «The European Democracy Shield and Its Whole-of-Society Approach», *Verfassungsblog*, 20 de noviembre de 2025, <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-european-democracy-shield-whole-of-society/>.
- ¹²⁰ Polona Car, «Enforcing the Digital Services Act: State of Play», *Epthinktank*, 21 de noviembre de 2024, <https://epthintank.eu/2024/11/21/enforcing-the-digital-services-act-state-of-play/>; Mark Scott, «In the Social Media Wars, Washington, Not Brussels, Is the Victor | TechPolicy.Press», *Tech Policy Press*, 10 de octubre de 2025, <https://techpolicy.press/in-the-social-media-wars-washington-not-brussels-is-the-victor>; Sofia Calabrese, «Big Tech Is Avoiding Responsibility - Here Is What the EU Can Do About It», *European Democracy Hub*, 26 de marzo de 2025, <https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/big-tech-is-avoiding-responsibility/>.
- ¹²¹ Paula Gori, «Why the EU Democracy Shield Must Back Promises With Real Funding |», *Tech Policy Press*, 17 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.techpolicy.press/why-the-eu-democracy-shield-must-back-promises-with-real-funding/>.
- ¹²² BBC, *Molly Russell Inquest: Instagram Clips Seen by Teen «Most Distressing»*, 23 de septiembre de 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-62998484>; Candice Biernesser et al., «Social Media Use and Deliberate Self-Harm Among Youth: A Systematized Narrative Review», *Children and youth services review* 116 (septiembre de 2020): 105054, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2020.105054>; Debasmita De et al., «Social Media Algorithms and Teen Addiction: Neurophysiological Impact and Ethical Considerations», *Cureus* 17, n.o 1 (s. f.): e77145, <https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.77145>.
- ¹²³ Peter Guo, «Under-16s Lose Access to Instagram and Facebook in Australia Ahead of Landmark Social Media Ban», *NBC News*, 21 de noviembre de 2025, <https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/instagram-facebook-cut-16s-australia-social-media-ban-rcna244914>; Datta, «EU Countries Back Child Safety Declaration».
- ¹²⁴ Datta, «EU Countries Back Child Safety Declaration».
- ¹²⁵ Arthur Leichthammer y Luise Quaritsch, *Why the DSA Is Not up for Negotiation*, Policy Position (Jacques Delors Centre, 2025), <https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/why-the-dsa-is-not-up-for-negotiation>; Calabrese, «Big Tech Is Avoiding Responsibility - Here Is What the EU Can Do About It».
- ¹²⁶ El Periódico. 2021. 'Plural, nuevo centro de masculinidades de Barcelona'. *El Periódico*. <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/mas-barcelona/20211011/plural-nuevo-centro-masculinidades-barcelona-12216956> (February 11, 2026).
- ¹²⁷ Amnesty International, «Toxic Tech: New Polling Exposes Widespread Online Misogyny Driving Gen Z Away from Social Media», 21 de marzo de 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/toxic-tech-new-polling-exposes-widespread-online-misogyny-driving-gen-z-away-social>.
- ¹²⁸ Maxine Molyneux et al., *New Feminist Activism, Waves and Generations* (UN Women, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.18356/25216112/40>; Mama Cash, *Literature Review: Feminist Activism Works!* (Mama Cash, 2020), <https://www.mamacash.org/resources/literature-review-feminist-activism-works/>.
- ¹²⁹ Stein Lubrano, *Don't Talk About Politics: How to Change 21st-Century Minds*.
- ¹³⁰ Javier Carbonell, *It's the Affordability, Stupid: What Mamdani's Victory Means for Europe*, Flash Analysis (European Policy Centre, 2025), <https://www.epc.eu/publication/its-the-affordability-stupid-what-mamdani-victory-means-for-europe/>.

The **European Policy Centre** is an independent, not-for-profit think tank dedicated to fostering European integration through analysis and debate, supporting and challenging European decision-makers at all levels to make informed decisions based on sound evidence and analysis, and providing a platform for engaging partners, stakeholders and citizens in EU policymaking and in the debate about the future of Europe.

The **European Politics and Institutions** programme covers the EU's institutional architecture, governance and policymaking to ensure that it can move forward and respond to the challenges of the 21st century democratically and effectively. It also monitors and analyses political developments at the EU level and in the member states, discussing the key questions of how to involve European citizens in the discussions over the Union's future and how to win their support for European integration. The programme has a special focus on enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans, questions of EU institutional reform and illiberal trends in European democracies.

With the strategic
support of



King Baudouin
Foundation

Working together for a better society